Introduction
The past few years have witnessed the rapid growth of research on the relationship between economic development and environmental quality. Gruver (1976) , John and Pecchenino (1994) , Lopez (1994) , Selden and Song (1995) , John et. al. (1995) and McConnell (1997) have done theoretical work on the relations linking income growth, pollution, regulation and abatement effort. This work has shown that an 'Environmental Kuznets Curve' (EKC) --an inverted-U relation in which pollution first rises and then falls as income increases --can result if a few plausible conditions are satisfied as income increases: Constant or falling marginal utility of consumption; rising marginal disutility of pollution; constant or rising marginal pollution damage; and rising marginal abatement cost.
Most econometric work on EKC relations has been reduced-form in character, regressing cross-country measures of ambient air and water quality on quadratic or higher-order specifications of income per capita (Hettige, et. al., 1992; Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 1992; Panayotou, 1993 Panayotou, , 1995 Shafik, 1994; Selden and Song, 1994; Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Holtz-Eatkin and Selden, 1995; Rock, 1996; Horvath, 1997; Cole et. al., 1997; Stern et. al., 1998) . The results are generally consistent with an EKC for air pollutants such as suspended particulates and sulfur dioxide, although results for water pollution are mixed. In most cases, the implied relationship is sensitive to inclusion of higher-order polynomial terms in income whose significance varies widely. In one of the most comprehensive reviews of the empirical literature on the EKC hypothesis, Stern (1998) argues that the evidence on the inverted-U relationship only applies to a subset of environmental measures and that other pollution problems increase through the existing income range. For example, Stern, et. al. (1998) find a monotonic increasing relation between sulfur emissions and income per capita.
Structural interpretation of reduced-form EKC results remains largely ad hoc, since data limitations have prevented detailed investigation of the sources of change in the marginal relationship between development and pollution. In a recent paper, Panayotou (1997) has attempted to estimate the impact of environmental regulation. Lacking actual measures of regulation, however, he uses indices of contract enforcement and bureaucratic efficiency as proxies. His main finding, at least for ambient SO 2 levels, is that the regulatory proxies are significantly associated with a flattening of the EKC and a reduction in the environmental cost of growth.
It has become clear that structural modeling of the income-environment relationship cannot advance much further without explicit measures of environmental policy. In this paper, we construct such measures and assess their relationship to socioeconomic development. Our information source is the set of environmental reports presented to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, 1992) by 145 countries. The reports are comparable because the UN imposed a standard reporting format. Using a multidimensional survey of 31 national UNCED reports, we have developed a set of comparative indices for the status of environmental policy and performance. This paper describes our methodology, the indices, and some results from a statistical analysis of their relationship to other more conventional measures of socioeconomic development. In the following section, we begin with a description of the UNCED reports. Section 3 explains our indexing method, while Section 4 sets out some preliminary hypotheses about the relationships linking environmental policy and performance to socioeconomic development. Section 5 reports and discusses some statistical tests of the hypotheses and Section 6 concludes the paper.
The UNCED Reports
As part of the preparations for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED -Rio de Janeiro, June 1992), all UN member governments were asked to prepare national environmental reports. Detailed preparation guidelines were laid down at the First Preparatory Committee meeting in Nairobi in August, 1990. 1 The UNCED secretariat suggested that the reports be prepared by working groups representing government, business and non-governmental organizations (NGO's). The guidelines recommended that the reports provide information on: (i) the drafting process; (ii) problem areas; (iii) past and present capacity building initiatives; (iv) recommendations and priorities for environment and development; (v) financial arrangements and funding requirements; (vi) environmentally sound technologies;
(vii) international cooperation; and (viii) expectations about UNCED.
The resulting reports are similar in form as well as coverage and permit cross-country comparisons. Undoubtedly, the participation of NGO's has helped assure that the UNCED reports are not mere government handouts. To a striking degree, they seem to reflect real environmental conditions and issues. While we recognize that self-reporting always carries the risk of misrepresentation, we should also note that almost all currently-available environmental information is self-reported by firms and governments. The UNCED reports differ principally in the absence of any formal sanction for misreporting.
Quantifying Environmental Performance
For this exercise, we have randomly selected 31 UNCED reports from the total of 145 (see Table 2A , p. 8). The 31 reporting countries range from highly industrialized to extremely poor, they are drawn from every world region, and they vary in size and diversity from China to Jamaica.
Our survey assesses the scope and impact of environmental policy in four dimensions:
Air, Water, Land and Living Resources. We analyze the apparent state of policy as it affects the interactions between these four environmental dimensions and five activity categories:
Agriculture, Industry, Energy, Transport and the Urban Sector. Although many overlaps undoubtedly exist, we attempt to draw a separate assessment for the interaction of each activity category with each environmental dimension.
Our survey assessment uses twenty-five questions to categorize the state of (i) environmental awareness; (ii) scope of policies adopted; (iii) scope of legislation enacted;
(iv) control mechanisms in place; and (v) the degree of success in implementation. 2 The status in each category is graded High, Medium or Low, with assigned values of 2, 1 and 0 respectively.
For each UNCED country report, all twenty-five questions are answered for each element of the matrix in Table 1 . With 20 elements in the matrix, 500 assessment scores are developed for each country.
Table 1 Evaluation Format
The survey instrument is included in Appendix B. Our questions in the first assessment category (Awareness) reflect recent findings that citizen awareness is a powerful determinant of the strength of environmental regulation (Dasgupta and Wheeler, 1996) . The three questions in this category gauge the strength of awareness by asking about its history and extent. Questions in the next two categories, Policy and Legislation, are largely self-explanatory. In the section on Control Mechanisms, we give high ratings to countries that use market-based regulatory instruments such as pollution charges, because recent research has shown them to be very costeffective in regulating pollution (Wheeler, et. al., 1999) . Similarly, we assign high ratings to more decentralized systems because recent research has suggested that they respond more efficiently to local environmental problems (Wang and Wheeler, 1996; Laplante, et. al., 1996) .
Research has also demonstrated the power of local communities, often acting through NGO's, to influence polluters even when formal regulation is absent or ineffective (Pargal and Wheeler, 1996; Afsah and Vincent, 1997; Blackman and Bannister, 1998 of Success are highly varied, enabling us to include both direct measures of environmental performance and factors which affect the public's ability to bring pressure on polluters through channels other than formal regulation (e.g., environmental data availability, interest in environmental studies, level of media interest).
We compute four composite indices by adding scores within each environmental dimension (Air, Water, Land and Living Resources). We also calculate a total score to provide a composite index of the scope and impact of environmental policy. Finally, we use our scoring system to establish separate indices for three particularly interesting policy dimensions: the extent of environmental awareness, enactment of policies, and success in implementation. We use all three sets of indices for the cross-country analysis reported in Section 5.
Using the four dimensional indices and a composite index, we summarize our results as country rankings in Table 2A . Actual values are displayed in Table 2B . Table 2A 
The Political Economy of Environmental Management
With the exception of research by Panayotou (1997) and a few others, empirical EKC studies have employed reduced-form regressions of air and water pollution indices on polynomial equations in income per capita. Statistical identification of an inverted-U relationship is generally rationalized as follows: In the early phase of development, environmental regulation is very weak or nonexistent and pollution-intensive industries grow rapidly. As countries approach middle-income status, some demand for environmental protection begins emerging. Industry begins to control its pollution at modest levels as regulations are enacted. At the same time, a shift toward services and less materials-intensive industries leads to a reduction in the generic pollution intensity of economic activity. Overall pollution begins leveling off, and then actually begins to decline as income-induced regulation, pollution control and structural change toward cleaner sectors become more significant. These structural relations remain largely untested because of data scarcity. In this paper, we use our regulatory indices to test one key proposition of the EKC hypothesis: That environmental regulation is weak or non-existent until countries reach middle-income status, after which it rapidly becomes a significant factor in reducing pollution. and the opportunity cost of mitigation. In reality, the extent and focus of government intervention will also reflect national political and institutional considerations.
Benefits
The demand for environmental quality should increase with income per capita, and we would expect this to be strongly reflected in our country scores. However, we recognize that the regulatory response will depend on actual environmental degradation. If environmentally benign activities are the main sources of growth in an economy, then we may observe little or no relationship between income and regulation. In addition, demographic and sectoral differences may play an important role. For example, economies with high rural population densities and heavy dependence on agriculture and forest extraction should be particularly concerned with agricultural water supply, soil erosion, and deforestation. In our Evaluation Format (Table 1) Energy, Transport and Urban. We would expect country scores in these dimensions to be correlated with the urban share of national population, urban population density, and the share of manufacturing in national output.
Opportunity Costs
Governments must make resource allocation decisions with constrained budgets, so we would expect the benefits of environmental improvement to be weighed against opportunity costs. In particular, environmental management has to share a limited social welfare budget with public health, education and other needs. Therefore the poorer the country, the more limited environmental management resources are likely to be. This should be another source of positive correlation between income per capita and country scores for regulation.
Political Economy
Political and institutional factors may also contribute significantly to cross-country 3 Agriculture includes wood production from plantations and primary forests.
variation in environmental policy and performance. Attention to environmental problems should reflect the political power of affected interest groups, the quality of their information about environmental damage, and the effectiveness of legal and regulatory institutions. Most environmental problems pit broad public interests against the profitable pursuit of manufacturing and extraction. Thus, we might expect our environmental performance indices to be correlated with measures of the degree of popular representation, freedom of information and education.
Performance should also be superior where legal and regulatory systems are relatively efficient.
Finally, environmental objectives may be promoted more strongly in economies where secure property rights lead to longer planning horizons.
Predicted Relationships
Within this simple framework, we can make some predictions about the probable strength and direction of empirical relationships across our sample countries. We consider three sets of indices: Overall policy and performance scores for Air, Water, and Land; a "Green" index (interaction of Agriculture with Water, Land and Living Resources) and a "Brown" index (interaction of Industry, Energy, Transport and Urban with Air and Water). We have also decomposed the Green and Brown indices into three subindices: Awareness of environmental problems; enactment of regulations; and success in implementation. However, as Table 4 indicates, the subindices are so highly correlated that more detailed analysis seems unnecessary. 1) Income per capita; 2) Degree of popular representation; 3) Freedom of information; 4) Security of property rights; 5) Development of the legal and regulatory system.
Controlling for these variables,
Green indices should be positively correlated with:
1) Rural population density; 2) Agricultural and forest production share of national output.
Brown indices should be positively correlated with: 1) Particular focus on public health, indexed by life expectancy 4 ; 2) Urban share of total population; 3) Population density; 4) Manufacturing share of national output.
Results

Income and Environmental Performance
Our results do not appear to reveal any instance of growth based predominantly on 'environmentally benign' sectors. The correlation between income and composite environmental policy rankings is clear in Table 2A . In bivariate regressions on the two income measures, recorded in Tables 5A and 5B , the income elasticity of environmental regulation is positive and highly significant in all environmental dimensions. The statistical fit is somewhat better when income is adjusted for purchasing power parity. Regulation of air pollution seems to have a higher income elasticity than the others. The scatter of the composite environmental index against ICPGDP (Figure 1 ) shows that the relationship is continuous over the entire range of incomes. In summary, our evidence strongly contradicts the view that countries must reach middle-income status before environmental regulation begins.
Inspection of regression outliers among developing countries reveals that India, Malawi and Jamaica have much higher scores than their incomes would predict, while Thailand, Ethiopia and Bhutan have lower-than-predicted scores. A more detailed analysis of outlier country experience (see Appendix A) suggests that environmental performance improves noticeably when the government integrates environmental management with development planning. The relatively superior performance of India, Jamaica and Malawi (as opposed to Thailand, Bhutan and Ethiopia) may be partly due to early movement on environmental policy, government focus on a few strategic issues, and active participation of communities in environmental management. 
Political Economy
For the reasons previously noted, effective environmental management may be seriously handicapped by lack of political, civil, and economic liberty; lack of an independent judicial system; and an inefficient or corrupt bureaucracy. To test these ideas, we have fitted regressions with several sets of institutional indicators previously used in the literature. In each case, limited availability of the indicators has forced us to run regressions on subsamples of countries. The first of these is a widely used set of political, civil and economic liberty indicators developed by Gastil. (Table 6 ). Each of these indicators is coded 1 to 5, with higher scores for lower liberty, so the expected sign of the coefficients is negative for both indicators. Freedom of property has the expected sign, but the other result is quite surprising:
Freedom of information is negatively associated with the environmental indices, ceteris paribus. 6 Scores for the BERI indicators are available for only fourteen of our thirty-one countries and are set so that positive relationships with environmental management would be consistent with our prior hypothesis. The regression coefficients are positive, as expected, but none are statistically significant (Table 7) .
Finally, we have tested indicators that reflect the efficiency of the legal and judicial system (LJS) and red tape in the bureaucracy (RTB). These were developed by the Country Assessment Service of Business International, Inc. 7 Unfortunately, the measures are available for only twelve of the thirty-one countries in our sample. In separate regressions for this subset of countries, both LJS and RTB emerge as significant explanatory variables. Since they are collinear, we have also computed their first principal component (PC1) and used it as a composite regressor. When it is included with ICPGDP (Table 8 ) the results show substantial improvement in the explanatory power of the regressions. The change in outliers indicates that the improvement is especially striking for Ireland, India and Thailand.
Green and Brown Indices
For both Green and Brown indices, performance is again strongly associated with income per capita, freedom of property and (in small samples) measures of regulatory efficiency. The two rural-sector variables (population density; proportion of GDP in agriculture and forestry) are only weakly associated with the Green index (Table 9a ). The fit is much better for the Brown index: degree of urbanization, population density and manufacturing share in GDP all have the expected signs and relatively high significance (Table 9b) . Life expectancy as a proxy for public health priority has no independent effect
Summary
Using a multidimensional survey analysis of UNCED reports, we have developed a set of comparative indices of environmental policy in thirty-one countries.
We use these indices to analyze an important component of the EKC model: the relationship between development and environmental regulation. Our results do not support the conventional assumption that environmental regulation only emerges in the middle stage of development. Instead, we find a we get a better fit when national incomes are adjusted for purchasing power parity. The income elasticities of our indicators are positive and highly significant in all environmental dimensions.
Our results suggest that protection measures for land and living resources precede those for water; action for reducing air pollution comes later. Available indices of Green sector importance have no measured effect on Green performance, but the corresponding Brown sector variables do have significant explanatory power. Overall, the regression fits are quite good.
The apparent effectiveness of institutional quality is also striking, although our information base is limited. The level of explanation in all regressions improves significantly when effectiveness of the legal/judicial system and efficiency of bureaucracy are included. To our surprise, however, none of the other plausible political economy measures seems to account for much.
In summary, our findings suggest that a detailed, quantified analysis of UNCED reports can yield comparable and plausible indices of environmental policy and performance across countries. Our results also suggest that knowledge of a country's income per capita and general administrative efficiency are sufficient to predict the status of environmental regulation with considerable accuracy. Finally, our results suggest that countries begin paying attention to environmentally-damaging activities long before they reach middle-income status. 2) Malawi established an environmental education unit in 1972. Government measures to promote women's role in development also focus on environmentally-relevant issues:
sanitation, safe water and community participation.
3) Jamaica has a vibrant NGO community that is heavily involved in environmental activities. Past and present capacity-building initiatives in environmental management and sectoral integration include: development of linkages with the private sector and NGO's in public-sector investment programs; creation of an inter-agency technical committee on environmental issues; integration of national environmental objectives into sectoral planning and decision-making; and development of general guidelines by the National Resources Conservation
Authority to inform the planning and policy decisions of sectoral agencies. 
